The Linnaean Hierarchy and the Evolutionization of Taxonomy, with Emphasis on the Problem of Nomenclature by de Queiroz, Kevin
Aliso: A Journal of Systematic and Evolutionary Botany
Volume 15 | Issue 2 Article 7
1996
The Linnaean Hierarchy and the Evolutionization
of Taxonomy, with Emphasis on the Problem of
Nomenclature
Kevin de Queiroz
Smithsonian Institution
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/aliso
Part of the Botany Commons
Recommended Citation
de Queiroz, Kevin (1996) "The Linnaean Hierarchy and the Evolutionization of Taxonomy, with Emphasis on the Problem of
Nomenclature," Aliso: A Journal of Systematic and Evolutionary Botany: Vol. 15: Iss. 2, Article 7.
Available at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/aliso/vol15/iss2/7
Aliso, 15(2), pp. 125-144 
© 1997, by The Rancho Santa Ana Botanic Garden, Claremont, CA 91711-3157 
THE LINNAEAN HIERARCHY AND THE EVOLUTIONIZATION OF TAXONOMY, 
WITH EMPHASIS ON THE PROBLEM OF NOMENCLATURE 
KEVIN DE QUEIROZ 
Department of Vertebrate Zoology 
National Museum of Natural History 
Smithsonian Institution 
Washington, District of Columbia 20560 
ABSTRACT 
During the post-Darwinian history of taxonomy, the Linnaean hierarchy has maintained its role as 
a means for representing hierarchical taxonomic relationships. During the same period, the principle 
of descent has taken on an increasingly important role as the basis for reformulated versions of 
fundamental taxonomic concepts and principles. Early in this history, the principle of descent provided 
an explanation for the existence of taxa and implied a nested, hierarchical structure for taxonomic 
relationships. Although an evolutionary explanation for taxa contradicted the Aristotelian context with-
in which the Linnaean hierarchy was developed, the nested, hierarchical structure of taxonomic rela· 
tionships implied by evolution was compatible with the practical use of the Linnaean hierarchy for 
conveying hierarchical relationships and seems to have reinforced this practice. Later changes asso-
ciated with the development of taxon concepts based on the principle of descent led to changes in the 
interpretation of the Linnaean categories as well as certain modifications related to use of the Linnaean 
hierarchy in representing phylogenetic relationships. Although some authors questioned use of the 
Linnaean hierarchy in phylogenetic taxonomies, most continued to use it in one form ot artother. More 
recently, taxonomists have considered the relevance of the principle of descent to nomenclature. They 
have found fundamental inconsistencies between concepts of taxa based on that principle and methods 
currently used to define taxon names, which are based on the Linnaean hierarchy. Although these 
inconsistencies can be corrected without totally eliminating the Linnaean hierarchy, the necessary 
changes would greatly reduce the importance of that hierarchy, particularly in the area of nomenclature. 
Moreover, the earlier development of taxon concepts based on the principle of descent effectively 
proposed taxonomic categories of greater theoretical significance than those of the Linnaean hierarchy. 
The historical trend of granting increasing importance to the principle of descent has reduced the 
significance of the Linnaean hierarchy to the point where it may no longer be worth retaining. 
Key words: evolution, Linnaean hierarchy, nomenclature, phylogeny, principle of descent, taxon 
names, taxonomic categories, taxonomic definitions, taxonomy. 
INTRODUCTION 
For almost 250 years, the Linnaean hierarchy has 
served as an important part of taxonomy's method-
ological foundation. During the last 140 of those years, 
the theory of evolution--or more accurately, the prin-
ciple of common descent-has steadily increased its 
contribution to taxonomy's theoretical foundation. 
These two cornerstones of contemporary taxonomy, 
the Linnaean hierarchy and the principle of descent, 
have coexisted harmoniously through most of their 
common previous history, but recently there have been 
signs that this situation cannot endure. After surviving 
the revolution brought about by initial acceptance of 
an evolutionary world view, as well as the more lo-
calized taxonomic reforms of the New Systematics and 
Phylogenetic Systematics, the Linnaean hierarchy is 
being challenged by a movement to extend an evolu-
tionary world view into the realm of nomenclature. 
This challenge affects most directly various nomencla-
tural principles and rules based on the Linnaean bier-
archy, but it also raises questions about the appropri-
ateness and usefulness of the Linnaean hierarchy itself 
as the basis for present and future taxonomy. 
In this paper I will examine the relationship between 
the Linnaean hierarchy and the principle of descent in 
taxonomy, emphasizing their conflict in the area of 
nomenclature. First, I will present some definitions, 
both to clarify my use of certain terms and to provide 
background information on both the Linnaean hierar-
chy and the principle of descent that are relevant to 
understanding their roles in modem taxonomy. I will 
then describe a series of changes in the principles and 
methods of taxonomy that I interpret as manifestations 
of the progressively more thorough acceptance of an 
evolutionary world view. In each case, I will examine 
the consequences of the change for the Linnaean hi-
erarchy. I will discuss in greatest detail the most recent 
of these changes, which centers on the issue of no-
menclature, describing how this change, unlike the 
previous ones, involves a more direct conflict between 
the Linnaean hierarchy and the principle of descent. I 
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will then address some misunderstandings, both actual 
and anticipated, concerning the replacement of the 
Linnaean hierarchy with the principle of descent as the 
foundation of the nomenclatural system. And finally, I 
will reassess the more general role of the Linnaean 
hierarchy in modem taxonomy. 
BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS 
In order to describe changes in the history of tax-
onomy related to the increasing importance granted to 
the principle of descent and their implications for the 
Linnaean hierarchy, I first need to define some terms. 
These definitions are intended to emphasize the rela-
tionship between the Linnaean hierarchy and the prin-
ciple of descent with regard to their roles as comer-
stones of taxonomy in general and nomenclature in 
particular. In addition, they are meant to make clear 
how I am using the defined terms rather than to de-
scribe how those terms have been used by other au-
thors. 
The Linnaean Hierarchy and the Principle of 
Descent 
The Linnaean hierarchy is the series of ranked tax-
onomic categories based on those adopted by Linnaeus 
(1758) to which taxa (named groups of organisms) are 
assigned. Linnaeus was not the first person to use tax-
onomic categories (Mayr 1982), but his categories 
formed the basis of most subsequent taxonomic sys-
tems. Linnaeus himself used six taxonomic catego-
ries-Regnum (Kingdom), Classis (Class), Ordo (Or-
der), Genus (Genus), Species (Species), and Varietas 
(Variety). Later taxonomists added the categories Fam-
ily and Division (botany) or Phylum (zoology), and 
they reduced the significance of Variety (botany) or 
eliminated it entirely (zoology), to form a set of seven 
principal categories. These seven principal catego-
ries-Kingdom, Division/Phylum, Class, Order, Fam-
ily, Genus, and Species-are often treated as obliga-
tory or mandatory (e.g., Simpson 1961; Mayr 1969a), 
so that a given organism must be assigned to a taxon 
in every one of them to be considered "satisfactorily 
classified" (Simpson 1961 : 18). Contemporary taxon-
omists also use several nonmandatory primary cate-
gories (e.g., Cohort, Tribe, Section, Series) as well as 
various nonmandatory secondary categories derived 
from the primary ones by attaching a rank-modifying 
prefix (e.g., Subclass, Infraorder, Superfamily) (see 
Jeffrey 1989 for a summary). Nevertheless, the con-
temporary hierarchy of taxonomic categories is basi-
cally Linnaean in that first, it is derived historically 
from the hierarchy of categories used by Linnaeus 
himself and second, its core is made up in a large part 
by the original Linnaean categories. The Linnaean hi-
erarchy is a hierarchy of taxonomic categories and 
should not be confused with taxonomic hierarchy in 
general, that is, with hierarchies of taxa. A series of 
nested taxa is intrinsically hierarchical (i.e., ranked or 
graded) regardless of whether its component taxa are 
assigned to taxonomic categories. Moreover, hierar-
chies of taxa can be represented by other means than 
taxonomic categories, for example, using diagrams, al-
phabetic or numeric position markers, or indentation. 
The principle of descent is the doctrine that living 
things are related through common descent (as op-
posed to a theory about the specific mechanism of evo-
lutionary change). It is what many people call the 
"fact" of evolution-the idea that the diversity of life 
is the result of descent with modification. The principle 
of descent is thus the most general evolutionary prin-
ciple. In the context of taxonomy, it is more funda-
mental than the idea of evolutionary change or the 
similarities and differences resulting from such 
change. Evolutionary change occurs only in the con-
text of descent, but descent can occur without evolu-
tionary change. Moreover, the fact that similarities and 
differences in the characters of organisms are produced 
by evolution does not automatically make a taxonomy 
based on those properties evolutionary, as is evidenced 
by countless artificial and preevolutionary taxonomies 
based on the same characters (see de Queiroz 1988, 
for further discussion). 
Taxonomic and Nomenclatural Systems 
The rest of the terms I will define are used to des-
ignate different kinds of methodological systems, that 
is, integrated or organized sets of conventions (includ-
ing principles, rules, and recommendations) designed 
to achieve some particular end. In the present context, 
it is important to distinguish between taxonomic and 
nomenclatural systems. A taxonomic system is an in-
tegrated set of conventions specifying how taxonomies 
are to be constructed; a nomenclatural system is an 
integrated set of conventions specifying how names 
are to be applied-that is, for naming taxa and regu-
lating the use of those names. These two kinds of 
methodological systems should not be confused with 
one another, though a given nomenclatural system 
might be considered part of a more comprehensive tax-
onomic system. I consider rules concerning what kinds 
of entities deserve to be recognized as taxa part of the 
taxonomic system, while the nomenclatural system is 
concerned with how those entities are named. It should 
be noted that the term "system" is used in at least two 
other senses in taxonomy, first, for taxonomies or clas-
sifications themselves (e.g., when they are described 
as natural versus artificial systems, or when we refer 
to Linnaeus's or Thome's system; see Nicolson 1997), 
and second, for the biological entities that are recog-
nized as taxa (e.g., when we talk about interbreeding 
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systems or systems of common ancestry; see Griffiths 
1974; de Queiroz 1988). 
Linnaean and Phylogenetic Systems 
For the purposes of the present paper, two kinds of 
taxonomic and nomenclatural systems are of primary 
interest. A Linnaean system, whether of taxonomy or 
nomenclature, is a system based on the Linnaean hi-
erarchy; a phylogenetic system is a system based on 
the principle of descent. The relationships among Lin-
naean and phylogenetic systems of taxonomy and no-
menclature are complex in that taxonomic systems can 
be both Linnaean and phylogenetic, while nomencla-
tural systems must be either one or the other. I will 
therefore briefly discuss some of those relationships 
and their bearing on the classification of individual 
taxonomic and nomenclatural systems. 
Linnaean systems.-In the case of taxonomic systems, 
the system used by Linnaeus himself was the original 
Linnaean system. Although modern taxonomic sys-
tems differ from the original Linnaean system in cer-
tain respects, they also retain a number of components 
of that system, one of the most important of which is 
the assignment of taxa to categories in the Linnaean 
hierarchy. If this characteristic-which serves to in-
dicate rank or relative position in the taxonomic hi-
erarchy-is considered the defining property of Lin-
naean taxonomic systems, then most contemporary 
taxonomic systems are Linnaean systems. This is the 
sense in which I will refer to Linnaean taxonomic sys-
tems in the remainder of the present paper. Among 
contemporary approaches to taxonomy (e.g., synthetic, 
phenetic, phylogenetic), there is considerable hetero-
geneity of opinion concerning the general concept of 
taxonomic relationship as well as how actual relation-
ships are to be analyzed. Nevertheless, when it comes 
to the representation of taxonomic relationships-rath-
er than their definition or determination-then (for the 
most part) the various contemporary taxonomic ap-
proaches all use Linnaean systems (e.g., Simpson 
1961; Davis and Heywood 1963; Mayr 1969a; Sneath 
and Sakal 1973; Eldredge and Cracraft 1980; Stace 
1980; Wiley 1981). Modern Linnaean systems of tax-
onomy are heterogeneous, and though their compo-
nents have been described by various authors, they 
have not been formally codified in the manner of cer-
tain nomenclatural roles (see below). 
In the case of nomenclatural systems, modern sys-
tems differ from that used by Linnaeus himself (e.g., 
1737, 1751) in many respects. Linnaeus and his con-
temporaries were largely attempting to replace the 
works of their predecessors (Nicholson 1991), includ-
ing existing taxon names. But once Linnaeus's general 
approach became widely accepted, later taxonomists 
became more concerned with preserving existing 
names. In keeping with this difference, the nomencla-
tural precepts articulated by Linnaeus emphasize the 
formation of taxon names, whereas many subsequently 
developed roles (e.g., those related to priority) concern 
the application of existing names in the context of re-
vised taxonomies (for historical reviews see McNeill 
and Greuter 1986; Ride 1986, 1988; Nicholson 1991; 
Melville 1995). In any case, as will be explained in 
detail below, both Linnaeus and most subsequent tax-
onomists used a method for defining taxon names 
based on the Linnaean Hierarchy, and I will treat this 
characteristic as the defining property of Linnaean no-
menclatural systems. According to this definition, and 
despite differences among the systems used in botany, 
zoology, and microbiology, all of the widely used con-
temporary nomenclatural systems are Linnaean sys-
tems. Unlike contemporary Linnaean systems of tax-
onomy, contemporary Linnaean syste:rris of nomencla-
ture have become highly formalized, with official gov-
erning congresses, commissions, and committees and 
published codes (ICZN 1985; IUMS 1992; IBC 1994). 
Phylogenetic systems.-Phylogenetic systems of tax-
onomy attempt to produce taxonomies that reflect phy-
logenetic relationships accurately and efficiently. As I 
will describe below, the development of phylogenetic 
taxonomic systems has been an extended process that 
has been accomplished largely in conjunction with 
Linnaean taxonomic systems. Thus, most phylogenetic 
systems have used the basic conventions of Linnaean 
systems (e.g., nested, nonoverlapping taxa and the Lin-
naean hierarchy), though some of the more recent ones 
have added restrictions concerning what kinds of en-
tities are to be recognized as taxa (monophyly) as well 
as new conventions for representing relationships (e.g., 
new categories, sequencing) (see Eldredge and Cra-
craft 1980; Wiley 1981; Forey 1992). Ideally, however, 
a phylogenetic system should retain only those ele-
ments that do not interfere with the accurate and ef-
ficient representation of phylogeny. Therefore, al-
though any particular phylogenetic system is inevita-
bly constrained by its history, if any of its conventions 
are found to interfere with the accurate and efficient 
representation of phylogeny, they may have to be mod-
ified or eliminated. Consequently, some recent phylo-
genetic systems have abandoned the Linnaean hierar-
chy (e.g., Hennig 1969, 1981, 1983; Ax 1987; de 
Queiroz and Gauthier 1992). 
In contrast with phylogenetic systems of taxonomy, 
which have been developing for more than 100 years, 
phylogenetic systems of nomenclature are a very re-
cent invention. Indeed, the proposals of de Queiroz 
and Gauthier (1990, 1992, 1994) seem to be the first 
attempts to formulate nomenclatural conventions 
based on the principle of descent. Although the general 
concepts and principles of this system have been set 
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out, its specific rules and recommendations are still in 
the process of active development (e.g., de Queiroz 
and Gauthier 1990, 1992, 1994; Sundberg and Pleijel 
1994; Bryant 1994, 1996; Schander and Thollesson 
1995; de Queiroz 1996; Lee 1996; Wyss and Meng 
1996; Cantino et al. 1997). In any case, nomenclatural 
systems based on the principle of descent currently 
have neither official governing congresses, commis-
sions, or committees nor published codes. Unlike the 
case with taxonomic systems, phylogenetic systems of 
nomenclature cannot be developed in conjunction with 
Linnaean nomenclatural systems, because (as will be 
explained below) the principle of descent and the Lin-
naean hierarchy provide alternative theoretical bases 
for those systems and thus are in direct conflict. 
THE EVOLUTIONIZATION OF TAXONOMY 
The proposal to replace the Linnaean hierarchy with 
the principle of descent as the foundation of the no-
menclatural system can be interpreted as the beginning 
of the most recent stage of what I will call the evo-
lutionization of taxonomy. I will use this cumbersome 
term to distinguish the long, drawn out process 
through which taxonomy has become ever more firmly 
based on the principle of common descent from the 
sudden shift in outlook that accompanied the initial 
widespread acceptance of that principle. Although the 
extended process can be considered a revolution in the 
sense that each of its stages involves a fundamental 
conceptual shift, some people may wish to restrict the 
term "Darwinian Revolution" to the events in some 
shorter time interval immediately following the pub-
lication of Darwin's (1859) Origin of Species. There-
fore, I will refer to the extended series of changes 
through which the principle of descent has taken on a 
progressively more important role in taxonomy as the 
evolutionization of that discipline. The account that 
follows is not intended to be a detailed chronicle of 
the process of evolutionization; instead, it is intended 
to describe some important stages in that process, em-
phasizing the common conceptual shift that underlies 
each stage and the consequences of specific changes 
for the Linnaean hierarchy. 
Early Stages: The Explanation for Taxa and the 
Structure of Taxonomic Relationships 
Conceptual changes.-The earliest stages in the evo-
lutionization of taxonomy were contemporaneous with 
the Darwinian Revolution in the restricted sense. Ini-
tial acceptance of the idea that living things were re-
lated through common descent affected taxonomy in 
at least two related ways. First, it provided an expla-
nation in the form of an underlying cause for the order 
that was manifested in existing taxonomies. Prior to 
1859, numerous taxa had already been recognized and 
named based on similarities and differences in the 
characters of organisms, but their existence was attrib-
uted to the Plan of the Creator or to some unknown 
natural law (Darwin 1859). The theory of descent with 
modification provided a scientific explanation for the 
existence of taxa; in other words, the natural law re-
sponsible for the existence of taxa was no longer un-
known. Second, the principle of common descent pro-
vided justification for a particular structure regarding 
taxonomic relationships. If the order in nature resulted 
from a divine plan known only to the Creator, or if the 
natural law responsible for that order remained undis-
covered, then the structure of taxonomic relationships 
might take several possible forms. For example, taxa 
might be partially overlapping or mutually exclusive, 
and they might occur in regular numerical patterns, 
such as fives, as proposed by the quinarians (see Win-
sor 1976; O'Hara 1988, 1991). On the other hand, if 
the order in nature resulted from common descent, 
then the structure of taxonomic relationships should 
have one particular form. Specifically, the principle of 
descent predicted a structure consisting of both nested 
and mutually exclusive groups. Nested groups were 
those formed by the descendants of successively more 
remote common ancestors in a single lineage; mutually 
exclusive ones by the descendants of ancestors whose 
lineages had previously diverged. Partially overlapping 
or intersecting groups were ruled out, or at least rele-
gated to secondary status, nor was there any reason to 
expect regular patterns of five. 
Effects on taxonomic practice.-The first change, ac-
cepting evolution as the underlying cause of taxonom-
ic order, contradicted the Aristotelian context within 
which the Linnaean hierarchy was originally devel-
oped (see Cain 1958; Ereshefsky 1994). Although this 
change was a necessary precursor to all subsequent 
stages in the evolutionization of taxonomy, it did not 
otherwise revolutionize taxonomic practice. By its 
very nature, an evolutionary explanation for the exis-
tence of taxa did not call into question either existing 
(nested, hierarchical) taxonomies or the methods that 
had been used to produce them. Instead, the taxono-
mies themselves were effectively assumed as the phe-
nomenon in need of an explanation, and, consequently, 
the methods that had been used to produce them were 
also tacitly accepted. The principle of descent was thus 
granted a rather superficial role as an after-the-fact ex-
planation or interpretation for previously recognized 
taxa (de Queiroz 1988). Moreover, once the idea of 
evolution was accepted, it could be used to explain 
any group that had been recognized previously on the 
basis of shared characters. Just as some groups could 
be explained as having inherited their shared charac-
ters from common ancestors, others could be explained 
as having evolved them through convergent or parallel 
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modifications (de Queiroz 1988, 1992a). Accepting 
evolution as the explanation for previously recognized 
taxa did not, by itself, cause significant changes in the 
methods of taxonomy, which seems to account for the 
common claim that the principle of evolution had no 
major impact on taxonomy. But this was not the only 
change brought about by the evolutionary world view, 
and others had significant effects on taxonomic prac-
tice. 
Thus, the other major change associated with initial 
acceptance of the principle of descent-the change 
concerning the structure of taxonomic relationships-
influenced taxonomic practice significantly. The fact 
that partially overlapping relationships were ruled out, 
or at least demoted to secondary status, while nested 
and mutually exclusive ones were granted primacy, af-
fected both the taxonomies and the taxonomic dia-
grams produced by taxonomists (e.g., O'Hara 1988, 
1991). These changes in taxonomic practice resulted 
from granting to the principle of descent a much more 
important role. By using the principle of descent to 
rule out certain kinds of groups and validate others, 
that principle was not being treated as a mere after-
the-fact explanation, as it was in the case of the first 
change described above. Instead, it was effectively be-
ing treated as an axiom or basic principle from which 
an important taxonomic concept-the general structure 
of taxonomic relationships-was derived or deduced. 
This difference in the role played by the principle of 
descent-that is, no role or mere after-the-fact inter-
pretation versus axiom or first principle-is a useful 
criterion for assessing the impact of that principle on 
other taxonomic concepts as well as on other disci-
plines (de Queiroz 1988). Moreover, all subsequent 
stages in the evolutionization of taxonomy are inter-
pretable as manifestations of a change in which the 
principle of descent is granted the same kind of im-
portance in other aspects of that discipline. I will re-
turn to this theme shortly, after addressing the effects 
of these first two changes on the Linnaean hierarchy. 
Effects on the Linnaean hierarchy.-Despite the im-
portance of the early changes brought about by accep-
tance of the principle of descent, those changes did not 
call the Linnaean hierarchy into question as the basis 
for the taxonomic system; in fact, they may have pro-
moted its use. The Linnaean hierarchy was easily rec-
onciled with the initial changes stemming from accep-
tance of an evolutionary world view because its 
groups-nested-within-groups structure mirrored the 
taxonomic structure implied by the principle of de-
scent. Therefore, not only could the idea of evolution 
be accommodated by the Linnaean hierarchy, it almost 
seemed to provide a justification for that hierarchy's 
continued use. Darwin (1859:456) himself argued that 
"the subordination of group to group in all organisms" 
followed naturally from "the view of common par-
entage of [allied] forms ... together with their modi-
fication," and that "the degrees of modification which 
the different group have undergone, have to be ex-
pressed by ranking them under different so-called gen-
era, sub-families, families, sections, orders, and class-
es" (p. 422). Most subsequent authors, with a few no-
table exceptions (e.g., Gilmour 1940, 1961; Sneath and 
Sokall973; Nelson and Platnick 1981), have followed 
Darwin in adopting the view that biological taxonomy 
attempts to express evolutionary relationships and uses 
the Linnaean categories to represent their hierarchical 
structure (for some relatively recent examples see 
Simpson 1961; Davis and Heywood 1963; Hennig 
1966; Mayr 1969a; Crowson 1970; Eldredge and Cra-
craft 1980; Wiley 1981; Mayr and Ashlock 1991). 
Intermediate Stages: Concepts of Taxa 
Conceptual changes.-Two important stages in the ev-
olutionization of taxonomy, both involving concepts of 
taxa, occurred almost 100 years after publication of 
The Origin. In the beginning of the 20th century, the 
principle of descent still played a superficial role with 
regard to concepts of taxa. Although that principle was 
now widely accepted, taxa continued to be recognized 
on the basis of similarity, with common descent in-
voked after-the-fact to explain why organisms shared 
the characters in which they were similar. The princi-
ple of descent had not yet been granted the role of an 
axiom or basic principle from which a concept of the 
biological taxon was derived by deductive reasoning. 
Changes in this situation were closely associated with 
two important taxonomic movements, and though the 
new concepts of taxa associated with those movements 
were anticipated by earlier authors (for examples see 
Mayr 1955; Craw 1992; Donoghue and Kadereit 
1992), the movements nevertheless seem to corre-
spond with periods of maximum discussion and 
change. 
The first change in taxon concepts was associated 
with the New Systematics (e.g., Huxley 1940; Mayr 
1942) of the Modem Evolutionary Synthesis (see 
Mayr and Provine 1980 for general historical review). 
One of the major contributions of the New Systematics 
was a reformulated species concept. Concepts of spe-
cies as groups of similar organisms were replaced with 
concepts of species as populations (e.g., Mayr 1942) 
or population lineages (e.g., Simpson 1951). This new 
species concept was effectively derived from the the-
ory of evolution in that the species category was 
equated with a class of basic evolutionary units (e.g., 
Simpson 1961; Hull 1965; Mayr 1969b); not surpris-
ingly, it necessitated the rejection of some taxa that 
formerly had been considered distinct species as well 
as the acceptance of other taxa that had not. Thus, 
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phenotypically distinct forms that made up a single 
interbreeding population were now considered morphs 
rather than different species, and phenotypically sim-
ilar forms that made up separate interbreeding popu-
lations were now considered separate cryptic or sibling 
species rather than single species (de Queiroz 1992b, 
1995). 
The second change involving concepts of taxa was 
associated with the movement known as Phylogenetic 
Systematics or Cladistics (e.g., Hennig 1965, 1966; 
Crowson 1970; Eldredge and Cracraft 1980; Wiley 
1981; Ax 1987). One of the important contributions of 
Phylogenetic Systematics was a reformulated concept 
of the higher taxon. Concepts of higher taxa as groups 
of similar species were replaced with concepts of high-
er taxa as clades, that is, monophyletic (holophyletic) 
groups of species. This new concept of the higher tax-
on was derived directly from the principle of descent 
in that it equated higher taxa with units of exclusive 
common ancestry, and once again, it necessitated the 
rejection of some previously recognized higher taxa as 
well as the acceptance of others that had not been rec-
ognized previously. Thus, new higher taxa were rec-
ognized for groups of species that, despite their phe-
notypic dissimilarity, formed single clades. And pre-
viously recognized higher taxa were eliminated, de-
spite the phenotypic similarity of their component 
species, if they did not correspond with clades. In other 
words, many new monophyletic taxa were recognized, 
and many paraphyletic taxa were eliminated (there had 
already been a trend to eliminate polyphyletic taxa). 
Botanical examples of new ·monophyletic taxa that 
were recognized as a result of reformulated higher tax-
on concepts include Stomatophyta, Polysporangio-
phyta, Eutracheophyta, Lignophyta, ·and Anthophyta 
(see Crane and Kenrick 1997); examples of paraphy-
letic taxa that were eliminated include Bryophyta, 
Pteridophyta, Progymnospermae and Gymnospermae. 
Effects on the Linnaean hierarchy.-Both of these 
changes in taxon concepts amounted to at least minor 
revolutions within taxonomy, but neither called the 
Linnaean hierarchy into question as the basis for the 
taxonomic system. The changes affected the way in 
which taxa were conceptualized, but they did not chal-
lenge the nested hierarchical structure of taxonomic 
relationships, and consequently, they did not contradict 
use of the Linnaean hierarchy for representing those 
relationships. Nevertheless, both had implications for 
the Linnaean hierarchy that affected it in more subtle 
ways, and changes related to the evolutionization of 
higher taxon concepts led some authors to question the 
use of the Linnaean hierarchy. 
Uncoupling of the species category.-The change 
in species concepts effectively redefined the Linnaean 
category Species--or more accurately, the term "spe-
cies"-and uncoupled it from the rest of the Linnaean 
hierarchy. Although Linnaeus himself granted special 
status to genera (Cain 1958; Mayr 1982), later authors 
tended to view all taxa as entities of more or less the 
same kind with the assignment of those taxa to the 
Linnaean categories indicating only their relative po-
sition in the taxonomic hierarchy. The reformulated 
species concept implied that species (and subspecific 
taxa) were entities of a fundamentally different kind 
than supraspecific taxa: species were unitary popula-
tions or population lineages, whereas supraspecific 
taxa were groups of such lineages. Furthermore, the 
new species concept established an objective (if not 
entirely operational) criterion for assigning taxa to the 
species category ("ranking" of some authors), while 
the criteria for assigning taxa to the various higher 
categories remained subjective (e.g., Mayr 1969a). 
Reformulation of the concept of the higher taxon 
reinforced the distinction between species and supras-
pecific taxa. Equating higher taxa with clades estab-
lished an objective criterion for recognizing such taxa 
("grouping" of some authors) but not for assigning 
them to the various categories of the Linnaean hier-
archy. Thus, although higher taxa (as clades) were no 
longer considered artificial, the higher Linnaean cate-
gories remained arbitrary ranks assigned to entities of 
a single kind (clades), and higher taxa (as clades) re-
mained entities of a fundamentally different kind than 
species (as population lineages). 
Basis of the higher categories.-The evolutioniza-
tion of higher taxon concepts also prompted system-
atists to propose various modifications to the Linnaean 
hierarchy concerning the theoretical basis of the su-
praspecific categories. One class of proposals attempt-
ed to provide a more objective and evolutionarily 
meaningful basis for those categories. The most basic 
of these proposals, which I will call Hennig's rule, was 
that sister taxa must have the same absolute rank-
that is, be assigned to the same Linnaean category 
(e.g., Hennig 1966). Hennig's rule gained wide accep-
tance, at least in certain circles. Moreover, because sis-
ter groups are equivalent in terms of age of origin, its 
application made taxa assigned to the same Linnaean 
category equivalent in an evolutionarily important re-
spect. This equivalence, however, was local in nature; 
that is, it did not extend beyond immediate sister taxa. 
A related proposal, also put forth by Hennig (1966; 
see also Crowson 1970; Farris 1976), was to equate 
the Linnaean categories with age classes. In Hennig's 
proposal, taxa originating between the Cambrian and 
Devonian would be assigned to a category of the Class 
stage (Superclass, Class, Subclass, etc.) those origi-
nating between the Mississippian and Permian to a cat-
egory of ordinal stage, and so forth. Under this pro-
posal, approximate temporal equivalence would extend 
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to all taxa assigned to the same Linnaean category, not 
only to immediate sister groups. Despite the great po-
tential benefits of such equivalence, the proposal to 
equate the Linnaean categories with age classes was 
not adopted by most subsequent authors (Ax 1987). 
Proliferation of higher categories and ways to avoid 
it.-Several other modifications to the Linnaean hier-
archy resulted from the evolutionization of other as-
pects of taxonomy, in particular, the development of 
analytical methods designed specifically to reconstruct 
phylogenetic relationships. The effects of these new 
analytical methods on the Linnaean hierarchy were 
primarily indirect, through the wealth of new mono-
phyletic taxa that were revealed by their empirical ap-
plication. Although systematists generally did not feel 
compelled to name and rank (i.e., in one of the Lin-
naean categories) every new putative clade revealed 
by their analyses, even the ones that they did choose 
to name and rank often exceeded the limits imposed 
by the 20 or so commonly used categories. Even the 
34 categories that could be formed with more exten-
sive use of the prefixes Super-, Sub-, and Infra- were 
insufficient, though earlier authors (e.g., Simpson 
1961) had thought that 34 categories was more than 
would ever be needed. The problem was not that the 
new taxonomies had more than 20-34 levels. Instead, 
the new taxonomies often required more than the three 
secondary categories that could be generated for ad-
jacent primary categories using the standard prefixes 
if they were to maintain consistency with the ranks of 
more and less inclusive groups (e.g., tO maintain Tra-
cheophyta as a Division arid Monocotyledoneae as a 
Class). Moreover, even if no new clades were named 
and ranked, systematists often wanted to convey the 
corresponding information about phylogenetic rela-
tionships. 
For these reasons, authors who preferred to name 
newly recognized clades modified the Linnaean hier-
archy further (remember that some modifications had 
already been made) by adding new taxonomic cate-
gories. McKenna (1975), for example, in a influential 
paper on the classification of mammals, used the new 
primary category Legion and the new prefixes Magn-, 
Grand-, and Mir- to generate several new levels be-
tween the traditional categories Class and Order. Sim-
ilarly, the new prefixes Capax- and Parv- were used 
by Gaffney and Meylan (1988). Extending this ap-
proach further, Farris (1976) proposed a systematic 
method for generating new taxonomic categories based 
on rank-modifying prefixes. In Farris's method, each 
prefix was assigned a modifier value, which would be 
added to or subtracted from the value of the primary 
category with which the prefix was combined (see Ta-
ble 1). Because no limit was placed on the number of 
prefixes that could be used, Farris's method could gen-
Table I. Values of primary categories and rank modifying pre-
fixes used in Farris's (1976) systematic method for generating tax-
onomic categories. 
Primary category ranks Rank modifying prefixes 
Kingdom 9 Gig a +4 
Division/Phylum 8 Mega +3 
Class 7 Hyper +2 
Cohort 6 Super +I 
Order 5 (none) 0 
Family 4 Sub l 
Tribe 3 Infra -2 
Genus 2 Micro -3 
Species Pi co -4 
erate an infinite number of categories, including not 
only new single-prefix categories such as Gigaclass 
and Picocohort but also novel multiprefix categories 
such as Supersuperorder and Submicropicofamily (see 
Kron 1997 for additional examples). Despite the logic 
of this proposal, it was not followed by most subse-
quent authors (but see Platnick 1977). 
Other authors wished to avoid the proliferation of 
both taxon names and taxonomic categories. Conse-
quently, they introduced modifications to their taxo-
nomic systems that conveyed information about phy-
logenetic relationships by other means than the Lin-
naean taxonomic categories. Nelson (1972, 1973) 
pointed out that the sequence of taxon names in a list 
could be used to convey information about relation-
ships, a convention that was adopted by several sub-
sequent authors {see Eldredge and Cracraft 1980; Wi-
ley 1981; and referencestberein). Taxa branching suc-
cessively from a single lineage in a tree were assigned 
to the same category and listed in order of their 
branching sequence so that each taxon in the list was 
the sister· group of the group composed of all taxa 
listed below it. This sequencing convention, as it latter 
became known, greatly reduced the number of both 
taxa and categories needed to convey information 
about relationships, but it necessarily left many clades 
unnamed. It also violated Hennig's rule. 
Many of the most severe cases of taxon and cate-
gory proliferation involved taxonomies that included 
both extant and extinct taxa. Not only did extinct taxa 
require their own names and ranks but, without se-
quencing, so did the more inclusive clades composed 
of the extinct taxa and their closest relatives. Even 
with sequencing, the convention that treated the seven 
principal categories as mandatory often required rec-
ognizing redundant (monotypic) taxa. For example, a 
new species intercalated between several sequenced 
taxa ranked as classes required the recognition of a 
new Class, a new Order, a new Family, and a new 
Genus, all including only that one known species. In 
the case of ancestral species, these assignments are 
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misleading (de Queiroz and Gauthier 1992) because 
the ancestor of a clade assigned to the category Order, 
for example, does not belong to any of the subordinate 
clades assigned to lower categorical levels (Hennig 
1966). To eliminate redundant taxa (whether extant or 
extinct) and their associated problems, Farris (1976) 
proposed abandoning the convention of mandatory 
categories (see also de Queiroz and Gauthier 1992). 
Patterson and Rosen (1977) also abandoned the con-
vention of mandatory categories, at least for extinct 
taxa, as part of their plesion convention. The plesion 
was a rankless category for extinct taxa that could be 
used at any taxonomic level (i.e., plesions could be 
anything from single species to speciose clades). The 
combination of sequencing and plesions (or otherwise 
eliminating the convention of mandatory categories) 
was very effective for reducing the numbers of taxa 
and categories used to represent phylogenies. Al-
though formulated within the context of Linnaean tax-
onomic systems, the sequencing and plesion conven-
tions were not themselves based on the Linnaean hi-
erarchy and effectively limited its role. 
Proposals to abandon the Linnaean hierarchy.-
Given the problems that Phylogenetic Systematics 
raised concerning the Linnaean hierarchy, it is not sur-
prising that this movement also produced the first se-
rious proposals to abandon the Linnaean hierarchy. 
Several authors constructed taxonomies without using 
the Linnaean categories, employing other devices to 
represent hierarchical relationships. Once again, Hen-
nig (1969, 1981, 1983) was a pioneer in using nu-
merical prefixes rather than Linnaean categories in his 
taxonomies of insects and chordates (see also Griffiths 
1974, 1976; L0vtrup 1977; Ereshefsky 1994). Other 
authors simply used indentation (e.g., Ax 1987; de 
Queiroz 1987; Estes et al. 1988; Gauthier et al. 1988a, 
b, 1989; Patterson 1988; Rowe 1988; Laurin 1991; de 
Queiroz and Gauthier 1992; Ford and Cannatella 1993; 
Sundberg and Pleijel 1994). Although numerical pre-
fixes have been criticized for being cumbersome and 
difficult to use in verbal communication (Wiley 1979, 
1981; Eldredge and Cracraft 1980; Ax 1987), these 
criticisms assume that numerical prefixes are formal 
substitutes for the Linnaean categories. On the con-
trary, they are more appropriately interpreted as simple 
devices for representing hierarchical relationships (de 
Queiroz and Gauthier 1992). As such, the set of pre-
fixes used in a particular taxonomy is specific to that 
publication, and consequently they need not ever be 
spoken, memorized, or made consistent with the pre-
fixes used in other taxonomies. Angiospermae, for ex-
ample, might have the prefix "2" in a taxonomy of 
anthophytes, but it might have the prefix 
"2.2.2.2.2.2.1" in a taxonomy of spermatophytes. 
Such prefixes do not carry any meaning beyond indi-
eating which taxa are sister groups (e.g., 2.2.2.1 and 
2.2.2.2) in taxonomies or taxonomically organized 
treatises spanning several to many pages, that is, in 
cases where simple indentation is inadequate for con-
veying the same information. 
In addition to avoiding use of the Linnaean hierar-
chy, several authors presented arguments for abandon-
ing it. Hennig (1969, 1981) argued that use of the Lin-
naean hierarchy often led to fruitless discussions con-
cerning the categorical assignments of taxa, which he 
considered a side-issue that diverted attention from the 
fundamental questions of phylogenetic research. Grif-
fiths (1974, 1976) suggested that use of the Linnaean 
hierarchy perpetuated confusion between the logical 
classes of the Linnaean hierarchy (taxonomic catego-
ries), with their historical ties to essentialism, and the 
phylogenetic entities of the taxonomic hierarchy 
(taxa). Other authors called attention to the nonequi-
valence of categorical assignments for taxa in different 
groups and the practical problem of generating enough 
new categories to cover the all hierarchical levels with-
in large clades (e.g., Gauthier et al. 1988a). Several of 
these objections were summarized by Ax (1987). 
Although the Linnaean hierarchy is not necessary 
for constructing hierarchical taxonomies, the problems 
noted above are not caused so much by that hierarchy 
as by its misinterpretation or misapplication. The Lin-
naean hierarchy may provide taxonomists with some-
thing over which they can engage in fruitless debates, 
but those debates stem as much from the misplaced 
emphases of taxonomists as from the Linnaean hier-
archy itself. Similarly, most taxonomists are aware that 
taxa assigned to the Family category, for example, are 
not equivalent across more inclusive taxa; the Linnae-
an hierarchy is therefore not directly responsible for 
the fact that some biologists treat such taxa as if they 
are equivalent. Likewise, though some systematists 
continue to confuse taxa and categories, most are 
aware of the distinction. Finally, historical associations 
with essentialism are not intrinsic to the Linnaean hi-
erarchy, which can be used as a simple representation-
al device without invoking the metaphysics of essen-
tialism. In short, the criticisms described above can be 
addressed, at least in theory, without abandoning the 
Linnaean hierarchy, and thus many systematists who 
adopt the general phylogenetic perspective underlying 
those criticisms continue to use and endorse that hi-
erarchy (e.g., Eldredge and Cracraft 1980; Wiley 1979, 
1981; Forey 1992). 
Summary.-The Linnaean hierarchy has survived 
(for the most part) the evolutionization of taxon con-
cepts, but not without concessions. Although most au-
thors continue to use taxonomic systems based on the 
Linnaean hierarchy, many of those systems use a mod-
ified hierarchy (i.e., by adding new ranked categories) 
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and some incorporate distinctly non-Linnaean ele-
ments (e.g., sequencing, rankless categories). Some au-
thors have constructed taxonomies without using the 
Linnaean hierarchy and have questioned its continued 
use, but the problems they have raised have not been 
viewed by other authors as necessary reasons for aban-
doning the hierarchy. On the other hand, the Linnaean 
hierarchy seems to constitute, as J. Gauthier (pers. 
comm.) calls it, an "attractive nuisance" -tempting 
biologists to treat taxa that are equivalent only in terms 
of their Linnaean categorical assignments as if they are 
also equivalent in terms of evolutionarily more mean-
ingful properties, and fostering biologically meaning-
less debates about the categorical assignments of taxa. 
This is roughly the present situation, though the next 
stage in the process of evolutionization is already be-
ginning. 
Most Recent Stages: Systems of Nomenclature 
This next stage in the process of evolutionization 
will extend a central role for the principle of descent 
into the realm of biological nomenclature. In this 
realm, the Linnaean hierarchy and the principle of de-
scent serve as alternative first principles from which 
other concepts and principles of their respective no-
menclatural systems are to be derived, and, conse-
quently, they are in direct conflict. To understand this 
conflict, it is first necessary to understand the most 
fundamental principle of nomenclature. Therefore, I 
will first describe this fundamental principle. I will 
then review the Linnaean systems of nomenclature in 
current use and a newly proposed phylogenetic system 
of nomenclature. I will focus on differences between 
these two systems with respect to the fundamental 
principle and the consequences of those differences for 
nomenclatural practices. Of particular interest will be 
the relationship between the names of taxa and the 
assignment of those taxa to categories in the Linnaean 
hierarchy as well as the advantages of adopting a phy-
logenetic system of nomenclature. I will also discuss 
some potential misunderstandings concerning phylo-
genetic systems of nomenclature and the consequences 
of adopting such a system for the future of the Lin-
naean hierarchy. 
The most fundamental principle of nomenclature.-Bi-
ological nomenclature is a vast set of names. The pur-
pose of a nomenclatural system is to govern the ap-
plication of those names, that is, their use in desig-
nating particular taxa. A definition is a statement spec-
ifying the meaning of a word. In the context of 
biological nomenclature, the words of interest are tax-
on names, and the meanings of those names are their 
designations of particular taxa. Furthermore, most of 
the other basic principles of biological nomenclature, 
such as those determining which names are to be con-
sidered synonyms and those determining which of sev-
eral synonyms is to be considered correct or valid, all 
rest directly or indirectly on definitions. Therefore, the 
most fundamental principle of any system of biologi-
cal nomenclature concerns the method by which taxon 
names are defined. 
Systems of nomenclature in current use.-In current 
systems of nomenclature, the definitions of taxon 
names are based on the Linnaean hierarchy. Despite 
the elaborate nature and codification of these systems, 
their method of definition is implicit rather than ex-
plicit. Perhaps this attests to the fundamental nature of 
definitions, which are so basic that they can be taken 
for granted. In any case, the codes say virtually noth-
ing about how taxon names are defined (the Zoological 
Code uses the term "definition" for what the Botanical 
Code more appropriately calls a description, which 
concerns taxa rather than taxon names). Consequently, 
the method of definition must be inferred from no-
menclatural practices, the most revealing of which are 
the practices of taxonomic division and unification 
(splitting and lumping). When a single taxon is divid-
ed, or when two are united, the application of names 
is determined according to categorical assignments and 
nomenclatural types, which implies that these two fac-
tors are the basis of taxonomic definitions. Thus, the 
implicit definition of the name "Asteraceae" is some-
thing along the lines of "the taxon including the Genus 
Aster that is assigned to the category Family," and the 
definition of the name "Liliales" is something along 
the lines of "the taxon including the Genus Lilium that 
is assigned to the category Order." Because such def-
initions specify the meanings of taxon names in terms 
of the Linnaean taxonomic categories, I will hereafter 
refer to them as Linnaean definitions. 
The Linnaean method of definition is implicit in the 
nomenclatural rules articulated by Linnaeus (1737, 
17 51), particularly those regarding the division and 
unification of genera (see Larson 1971). It was used 
in the precursors of the international codes (e.g., 
Strickland et al. 1843; de Candolle 1867) as well as 
in early versions of those codes (e.g., me 1906; ICZN 
1905), and it has been retained in the modern codes 
(ICZN 1985; IUMS 1992; IBC 1994). The Linnaean 
method of definition was reinforced by the later no-
menclatural convention of using standard endings for 
names associated with particular taxonomic categories 
(e.g., "-aceae" for plant families, "-ales" for plant 
orders, etc.; see Jeffrey 1989). A consequence of this 
convention was that implicit Linnaean categorical as-
signments became built-in to many taxon names. 
Because the method of definition is the most fun-
damental principle of nomenclature, the use of defi-
nitions based on the Linnaean hierarchy implies that 
the nomenclatural systems embodied in the modern 
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Table 2. Phylogenetic definitions. See de Queiroz and Gauthier 
(1990, 1992, 1994) for diagrammatic representations of the same 
classes of definitions. In the Appendix, the distinction between node-
based and stem-based definitions is illustrated in a proposal that uses 
this distinction to eliminate an inconsistency in the botanical code. 
Definition type 
Node-based 
Stem-based 
Apomorphy-bascd 
General structure 
The clade stemming from the most recent 
common ancestor of a and b.• 
The clade composed of c and all mem-
bers of x that share a more recent com-
mon ancestor with c than with d.b 
The clade stemming from the first ances-
tor of y to evolve character e.c 
' Where a and b are organisms, species, or clades. 
b Where c and d are organisms, species, or clades, and x is a clade 
that includes both c and d. 
c Where y is an organism, a species, or a clade, and e is a derived 
character. 
codes are Linnaean systems. The conclusion is ines-
capable that nomenclatural systems of this kind have 
survived previous stages in the evolutionization of tax-
onomy-from the publication of The Origin to the re-
formulation of taxon concepts. Darwin himself was 
involved in the development of an early zoological 
code (Strickland et al. 1843) based on the Linnaean 
method of definition, and this method has been ac-
cepted by almost all subsequent authors (but see be-
low). Nevertheless, the evolutionization of taxon con-
cepts-particularly that involving the higher taxa-
created an inconsistency between how taxa were con-
ceptualized and how their names were defined. This 
inconsistency was noted by Griffiths (1976:172), who 
pointed out that " ... the categories in which taxa are 
classified force authors who disagree about the cate-
gorical rank of any taxon to apply different names to 
it even if they are in full agreement about what organ-
isms the taxon includes", or more generally, that the 
dependency of nomenclature on Linnaean categorical 
assignments results in different authors applying " ... 
the same name to different taxa, or different names to 
the same taxon." But few authors concerned them-
selves with this inconsistency until a new method of 
definition, and thus the foundation for an entirely dif-
ferent kind of nomenclatural system, was proposed. 
A phylogenetic system of nomenclature.-This new 
method of definition is based on the principle of de-
scent. In contrast with Linnaean definitions, which 
specify the meanings of taxon names in terms of the 
Linnaean taxonomic categories, phylogenetic defini-
tions (de Queiroz and Gauthier 1990, 1992, 1994; see 
also de Queiroz 1992a, 1995, 1996; Bryant 1994, 
1996; Sundberg and Pleijel 1994; Schander and Thol-
lesson 1995) specify the meanings of taxon names in 
terms of ancestry and descent (Table 2). For example, 
the name "Asteraceae" might be defined as "the clade 
stemming from the most recent common ancestor of 
Barnadesia and Aster" (node-based definition) and the 
name "Angiophyta" might be defined as "the clade 
composed of Angiospermae and all seed plants that 
share a more recent common ancestor with angio-
sperms than with Gnetales" (stem-based definition) 
(see Doyle and Donoghue 1993). Such definitions are 
phylogenetic in that the concept of common ancestry 
is fundamental to the specified meanings of the defined 
names. As I will describe below, the explicitly evo-
lutionary basis of phylogenetic definitions removes the 
inconsistency between how taxa are conceptualized 
(i.e., after the evolutionization of taxon concepts) and 
how their names are defined. In so doing, phylogenetic 
definitions provide the foundation for a fundamentally 
different approach to biological nomenclature than that 
represented by traditional systems based on the Lin-
naean hierarchy. A system of nomenclature adopting 
this new approach is a phylogenetic system in that its 
most fundamental principle, the method of definition, 
is based on the principle of descent. 
Consequences of a phylogenetic system.-Not surpris-
ingly, a change in the basis of the nomenclatural sys-
tem has consequences for taxonomic practice. Most 
importantly, a phylogenetic system would fundamen-
tally alter the application of taxon names. This can be 
seen most clearly in an example (Fig. I) comparing 
the application of names under Linnaean (Fig. 2) and 
phylogenetic (Fig. 3, 4) systems. 
In Linnaean systems, definitions are dependent on 
the Linnaean hierarchy and thus categorical assign-
ments play a critical role in the application of taxon 
names. Consider the example (Fig. l) of a taxon and 
its two immediately subordinate taxa under two dif-
ferent Linnaean ranking (categorical assignment) 
schemes (Fig. 2) with the following names and Lin-
naean definitions (these definitions are implicit in the 
names but are spelled out here for the sake of com-
pleteness): Alphineae = the taxon containing Alpha 
that is assigned to the Linnaean category Suborder; 
Alphaceae = the taxon containing Alpha that is as-
signed to the Linnaean category Family; and Alphoi-
deae the taxon containing Alpha that is assigned to 
the Linnaean category Subfamily. Under these Lin-
naean definitions, a given name can designate different 
taxa under different Linnaean ranking schemes; for ex-
ample, the name "Alphaceae" designates taxon 2 un-
der the first scheme and taxon 1 under the second. 
Conversely, a given taxon can be designated by dif-
ferent names under different Linnaean ranking 
schemes; for example, taxon I bears the name "Al-
phineae" under the first scheme and "Alphaceae" un-
der the second. Under Linnaean systems of nomencla-
ture, differences in Linnaean categorical assignments 
among authors, or changes in such assignments over 
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Taxon 1 
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Fig. 1. Phylogeny of hypothetical taxa used to compare the application of taxon names under Linnaean (Fig. 2) and phylogenetic (Fig. 
3, 4) systems of nomenclature. For the example of Linnaean systems (Fig. 2), the names of the terminal taxa are treated as if they are the 
names of genera; for the example of phylogenetic systems (Fig. 3, 4), the categorical assignments of the terminal taxa are irrelevant. 
time, can have profound consequences regarding the 
associations between taxa and taxon names. 
In a phylogenetic system, definitions are indepen-
dent of the Linnaean hierarchy and thus categorical 
assignments play no role in the application of taxon 
names. Consider the same example (Fig. 1) of a taxon 
and its two immediately subordinate taxa under two 
different Linnaean ranking schemes (Fig. 3) but with 
the following names and node-based phylogenetic def-
initions: Alphathetonia the clade stemming from the 
most recent common ancestor of Alpha and Theta; Al-
phadeltina = the clade stemming from the most recent 
common ancestor of Alpha and Delta; and Thetazetina 
= the clade stemming from the most recent common 
ancestor of Zeta and Theta. Under these phylogenetic 
definitions a given name designates the same taxon 
regardless of Linnaean categorical assignments; for ex-
ample, the name "Alphathetonia" refers to taxon 1 
whether that taxon is ranked as a Suborder (Fig. 3, 
CATEGORY 
Suborder 
Family 
Scheme One 
Alphineae 
Alphaceae Thetaceae 
left) or a Family (Fig. 3, right). Conversely, a given 
taxon is designated by the same name regardless of 
Linnaean categorical assignments; for example, taxon 
3 bears the name "Thetazetina" regardless of whether 
that taxon is ranked as a Family (Fig. 3, left) or a 
Subfamily (Fig. 3, right). In this example, I have used 
neutral endings to avoid Linnaean connotations (e.g., 
that a name ending in "-aceae" is associated with a 
taxon assigned to the Family category); however, the 
same conclusions would apply even if endings tradi-
tionally associated with the Linnaean categories had 
been used, provided that the names had been defined 
phylogenetically (Fig. 4). Thus, if the name "Alpha-
ceae" (rather than "Alphadeltina") had been defined 
as designating the clade stemming from the most re-
cent common ancestor of Alpha and Delta, that name 
would be the name of taxon 2 regardless of whether 
taxon 2 was ranked as a Family or a Subfamily. Under 
a phylogenetic system of nomenclature, differences in 
CATEGORY 
Family 
Scheme Two 
Alphaceae 
Subfamily Alphoideae Thetoideae 
Fig. 2. The meanings of names defined under Linnaean systems vary depending on Linnaean categorical assignments. The names of 
all three taxa (1-3 of Fig. 1) are different under one ranking scheme (left) versus the other (right), and the only name used under both 
schemes (Alphaceae) designates a different taxon (2 versus 1) under the different schemes. Types are signified by asterisks(*). See text 
for definitions. 
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CATEGORY 
Suborder 
Family 
Scheme One 
Alphathetonia 
Alphadeltina Thetazetlna 
CATEGORY 
Family 
Subfamily 
Scheme Two 
Alphathetonia 
Alphadeltina Thetazetina 
tG c: E ~ .Q ~ ~ 18 ·;;; .!! 
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Fig. 3. The meanings of phylogenetically defined names are unaffected by Linnaean categorical assignments I. The names of all three 
taxa (1-3 of Fig. I) are identical under the two different Linnaean ranking schemes (left versus right), and all three names designate the 
same taxa under the different schemes. Neutral endings have been used to avoid the connotations of endings associated with one of the 
Linnaean categories under Linnaean systems of nomenclature. See text for definitions. 
Linnaean categorical assignments among authors, or 
changes in such assignments over time, have no effect 
on the associations between taxa and taxon names. A 
given name designates the same taxon and a given 
taxon is designated by the same name regardless of 
categorical assignments. 
The use of phylogenetic definitions has important 
consequences for the Linnaean hierarchy. Specifically, 
the assignments of taxa to categories in the Linnaean 
hierarchy would become superfluous, at least with re-
spect to nomenclature. Categorical assignments would 
not have any bearing on the names of taxa, and con-
CATEGORY 
Suborder 
Family 
Scheme One 
Alphaceae 
Alphineae 
c: 
.Q 
·;;; 
.a-
Thetaceae 
versely, they would not have any bearing on the mean-
ings of taxon names. Once defined phylogenetically 
(and regardless of endings), the name of a taxon would 
not change when the rank of the taxon was changed. 
For example, the name "Alphadeltina" (or "Alpha-
ceae") would not change simply because the categor-
ical assignment of the taxon designated by that name 
changed from Family to Subfamily (Fig. 3, 4). Con-
sequently, the endings or suffixes associated with par-
ticular Linnaean categories under the nomenclatural 
systems in current use would no longer have any sig-
nificance in terms of categorical assignment. The fact 
Scheme Two 
CATEGORY 
Family 
Subfamily Alphaceae 
~ 
~ 
Alphineae 
Thetaceae 
Fig. 4. The meanings of phylogenetically defined names are unaffected by Linnaean categorical assignments II. This example is identical 
to that illustrated in Fig. 3 except that the names have endings traditionally associated with particular Linnaean categories (in this case, 
Suborder, Family, and Subfamily). The names are defined as follows: Alphineae the clade stemming from the most recent common 
ancestor of Alpha and Theta; Alphaceae the clade stemming from the most recent common ancestor of Alpha and Delta; and Thetaceae 
= the clade stemming from the most recent common ancestor of Zeta and Theta. Under these definitions, the names of all three taxa (1-
3 of Fig. I) are identical under the two different Linnaean ranking schemes (left versus right), and all three names designate the same taxa 
under the different schemes. 
VOLUME 15, NUMBER 2 Linnaean Hierarchy and Phylogeny 137 
Saplndaceae 
c: Hlppocastanaceae 
~ .----, 
c: 
CD 
~ 
~ ~ j! as 
a:l 
~ 
c: 
C) 
c: 
::J 
a:l 
'C: 
CD 
'5 
!!! a:l :!1! a; 
0 ~ ::.::: 
en a:l a:l ::I 
·c: a:l 
"0 0 '2 '2 c: L: !l ·:; ·a Q. 0 
a:l ::I ::I L: 
rJ) w (..) 1-
Aceraceae 
r----1 )( 
2::-
a:l ! a:l a:l a:l '2 c: a:l 'iii 0 
·:; a:l '2 CD e c: 0 >. a:l C) ... ! CD c: a:l 'I::' "0 ~ a; :2 L: CD ·c: 1- < rJ) m 0 0 
Fig. 5. Under phylogenetic definitions, names with identical endings can refer to nested rather than mutually exclusive clades. For the 
purpose of this example, "Aceraceae" is defined as the clade stemming from the most recent common ancestor of Acer and Dipteronia, 
and Sapindaceae is defined as the clade stemming from the most recent common ancestor of Handeliodendron, Hype/ate, Koelreuteria, 
Sap indus, Athayana, and Diatenopteryx. Although the names of both taxa end in "-aceae", Aceraceae is a subgroup of Sapindaceae. The 
situation with Hippocastanaceae is similar to that for Aceraceae. Names and tree (but not definitions) are from Judd et al. (1994). 
that a taxon name ended in "-aceae," for example, 
would not imply that the taxon designated by that 
name was a Family; it might in fact be an Order, and 
it need not be assigned to any Linnaean category at 
all. Nor would this ending imply anything about hi-
erarchical relationships. With revised ideas about phy-
logeny, names with the same ending might tum out to 
designate nested (rather than mutually exclusive) taxa. 
For example, according to the phylogeny of Judd et 
al. (1994), node-based phylogenetic definitions of the 
names "Sapindaceae" and "Aceraceae" based on cur-
rent hypotheses about the composition of the taxa des-
ignated by those names implies that Aceraceae is nest-
ed within Sapindaceae (Fig. 5). (This situation already 
exists, to a certain degree, for names with endings that 
do not have a mandatory association with one of the 
Linnaean categories, for example, those ending in 
"-phyta.") In summary, the evolutionization of taxo-
nomic definitions would render the categorical assign-
ments of taxa irrelevant with respect to nomenclature 
and thus reduce the importance of Linnaean hierarchy 
considerably. 
Advantages of a phylogenetic system.-By granting 
the principle of descent a central role in the definitions 
of taxon names, the nomenclatural proposal described 
above represents yet another stage in the evolutioni-
zation of taxonomy. But apart from continuing the his-
torical process of evolutionization, one might ask 
why-from the viewpoint of the practicing taxono-
mist-we would want to make such a fundamental 
change. The reason is simple and concerns the basic 
goals and purposes of nomenclatural systems in gen-
eral and the current codes in particular; that is, to pro-
mote nomenclatural clarity, universality, and stability. 
These concepts can be defined as follows (de Queiroz 
and Gauthier 1994): clarity means that the associations 
between names and taxa should be unambiguous; uni-
versality means that all biologists should use the same 
names for the same taxa; and stability means that the 
associations between names and taxa should remain 
constant over time. Although the current systems of 
nomenclature promote nomenclatural clarity, univer-
sality, and stability, they do so in an inappropriate the-
oretical context. 
Under the current Linnaean systems of nomencla-
ture, that which is clear, universal, and stable is the 
association between a taxon name and one of the Lin-
naean taxonomic categories. For example, both "Al-
phaceae", the name of a hypothetical taxon, and 
"Brassicaceae", the name of a real taxon, are unam-
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biguously associated with the Family category by all 
taxonomists operating under a Linnaean system of no-
menclature, and they will remain associated with that 
category even if the taxa assigned to it change. Thus, 
"Alphaceae" remains associated with the Family cat-
egory even if the taxon designated by that name 
changes from taxon 2 to taxon 1 (Fig. 2) and "Bras-
sicaceae" remains associated with the Family category 
even if the taxon designated by that name changes 
from a clade that excludes the species referred to Cap-
paraceae to one that includes them (see Judd et al. 
1994). But these and other associations with the Lin-
naean taxonomic categories are not the most relevant 
aspect of meaning for the modem taxonomist. Because 
of the earlier stages in the evolutionization of taxon-
omy, taxon names now have at least implicit phylo-
genetic meanings, and this is true even for those sys-
tematists who continue to operate under Linnaean sys-
tems of nomenclature. In other words, taxon names 
now have associations not only with the Linnaean cat-
egories but also with particular parts of the phyloge-
netic tree of life-that is, with particular clades or the 
sets of species of which they are composed. 
For anyone who accepts the advances of earlier 
stages in the evolutionization of taxonomy, the second 
aspect of meaning is more significant. This explains 
why taxonomists so often balk at proposals that would 
change the circumscription of a taxon and thus the 
implicit phylogenetic meaning of its name. Continuing 
with the previous hypothetical example (Fig. 2), taxon 
2 is a different entity than taxon 1; therefore, changing 
the designation of a name from one taxon to the other 
goes against clarity, universality, and stability in im-
plicit evolutionary meaning. If some authors accept the 
proposal and others reject it, the association of the 
name with a particular taxon (clade) is not universal 
among authors; consequently, this aspect of the name's 
meaning is ambiguous. And even if all biologists even-
tually come to accept the proposal, the association of 
the name with a particular taxon/clade will have 
changed over time. If we accept evolutionary concepts 
of higher taxa, we can hardly deny that Linnaean sys-
tems of nomenclature fail to accomplish their primary 
purpose. 
In contrast with the situation under Linnaean sys-
tems of nomenclature, under a phylogenetic system, 
that which is clear, universal, and stable is the asso-
ciation between a taxon name and a clade or mono-
phyletic group of species. Under Linnaean definitions, 
names have no explicit associations with clades or 
monophyletic taxa; any such associations are implicit. 
Phylogenetic definitions make those associations ex-
plicit by expressly defining taxon names as designating 
particular taxa (clades). Consequently, the association 
of a taxon name with a clade or monophyletic group 
of species becomes the most fundamental aspect of the 
name's meaning. That is to say, association of the 
name with a part of phylogeny becomes more impor-
tant than its association with one of the Linnaean cat-
egories. This is the reason that the associations be-
tween names and taxa are unaffected by changes in 
categorical assignments, as is illustrated in the exam-
ples above (Fig. 3, 4). Thus, provided that all authors 
adopt the same definitions (as presumably they would 
under a phylogenetic code), they will apply the same 
names to the same taxa. By emphasizing phylogenetic 
relationships instead of categorical assignments, phy-
logenetic definitions promote nomenclatural clarity, 
universality, and stability in terms of a theoretically 
significant aspect of meaning. 
Clarifications.-Replacing the foundation of the no-
menclatural system would constitute a minor revolu-
tion, at least within systematic biology. One might 
therefore expect that the change will not be made eas-
ily. Considering the previous stage in the evolutioni-
zation of taxonomy reinforces this concern. During the 
1970s and 80s, bitter intellectual battles were fought 
over concepts of higher taxa, and debates continue to 
the present (e.g., Stuessy 1997). In addition, the prin-
ciples and rules of nomenclature are formalized to a 
much greater degree than concepts of higher taxa ever 
were. Concepts of higher taxa were never endorsed by 
official congresses, commissions, or committees, nor 
were they formalized in published codes. If resistance 
to change is correlated with degree of formalization, 
then we can expect future battles over nomenclature 
to be even more bitter than past ones over concepts of 
higher taxa. For this reason, I would like to clarify 
some areas of potential confusion in hopes of avoiding 
criticisms based solely on misunderstandings. 
Implications for the Linnaean hierarchy, hierarchi-
cal taxonomies, and names.-Several potential mis-
understandings concern the implications of a phylo-
genetic system of nomenclature for certain taxonomic 
traditions, in particular, the Linnaean hierarchy, hier-
archical taxonomies, and familiar taxon names. Al-
though adopting a phylogenetic system of nomencla-
ture would greatly limit the importance of the Linnae-
an hierarchy in the realm of nomenclature, it would 
not require total elimination of the Linnaean hierarchy 
from taxonomy. That is to say, taxa could still be cat-
egorized (ranked) as Orders, Families, Subfamilies, 
etc., even if those categorical assignments had no in-
fluence on taxon names. The categories would then be 
treated as simple representational devices lacking both 
theoretical and nomenclatural significance, much like 
the numerical prefixes discussed above. On the other 
hand, a phylogenetic system of nomenclature would 
permit total elimination of the Linnaean hierarchy 
from taxonomy; otherwise, total elimination of the 
Linnaean hierarchy is impossible. As long as the ap-
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plication of taxon names is governed by a Linnaean 
system of nomenclature, even taxonomies that avoid 
explicit use of the Linnaean categories are still using 
those categories implicitly. 
A second potential misunderstanding concerns the 
hierarchical structure of taxonomies. Even if the Lin-
naean hierarchy is totally eliminated from taxonomy, 
this does not mean that taxonomies would no longer 
be hierarchical. As noted above, the Linnaean hierar-
chy of taxonomic categories should not be confused 
with hierarchical taxonomies in general. A system of 
ranked taxonomic categories is not the only way to 
represent nested hierarchical relationships, which can 
be represented using branching diagrams, Venn dia-
grams, numeric prefixes, indentation, and various other 
devices. Because nested, hierarchical taxonomic struc-
ture is a deduction from the principle of descent, it 
cannot be contradicted by a method of definition de-
rived from that same principle. 
A third potential misunderstanding is the idea that 
eliminating the Linnaean hierarchy means eliminating 
or replacing established and familiar taxon names. Lin-
naean definitions can be replaced with phylogenetic 
definitions without replacing the names themselves. 
For example, the name "Adoxaceae" is traditionally 
defined (implicitly) as "the Family containing the Ge-
nus Adoxa," but the same name could be redefined 
phylogenetically as "the most recent common ancestor 
of Viburnum, Sambucus, [and] Adoxa, and all of its 
descendants" (Judd et al. 1994:25). The names need 
not change, only their definitions. Alternatively, new 
names could be coined (e.g., using different endings) 
to emphasize their novel definitional basis (e.g., Kron 
1997). The advantage of redefining existing names is 
continuity with the previous literature; the disadvan-
tage is their Linnaean connotations (e.g., "Adoxa-
ceae" might be assumed to be the name of a Family 
even if the taxon designated by that name was as-
signed to a different Linnaean category or if it was not 
assigned to a Linnaean category at all). The advantage 
of coining new names is that they would have no Lin-
naean connotations; the disadvantage is loss of conti-
nuity with the previous literature. 
Clarity, universality, and stability.-By explicitly 
associating taxon names with particular taxa (clades), 
phylogenetic definitions promote the unambiguous ap-
plication of names to taxa, and in this respect they also 
promote the development of a universal and stable no-
menclature. Linnaean definitions also promote the un-
ambiguous application of names to taxa and the de-
velopment of a universal and stable nomenclature, 
though they do so in very different theoretical context. 
In an ontological sense, acceptance of a definition-
whether Linnaean or phylogenetic--ensures that a par-
ticular name will always be applied to the same taxon. 
Sameness in this context refers to an ideal truth-the 
true taxon assigned to a particular Linnaean category 
(whatever that may mean) or the true clade as it exists 
in reality (as opposed to our conjectures about reality). 
Such truths, however, cannot be known with certainty. 
Because names can only be applied in the context of 
taxonomic hypotheses, there can be no guarantee that 
the taxon to which a particular name is applied will 
be identical in terms of its hypothesized composition 
from one taxonomic hypothesis to the next, and this is 
the case under both Linnaean and phylogenetic sys-
tems of nomenclature. 
Under Linnaean systems, different authors will only 
apply the same names to taxa of identical hypothesized 
composition if those authors both recognize taxa of 
identical composition and assign those taxa to the 
same categories in the Linnaean hierarchy (e.g., if they 
all adopt the ranking scheme on one side, left or right, 
of Fig. 2). If different authors recognize taxa that differ 
in composition, or if categorical assignments differ be-
tween authors (e.g., if some adopt the scheme on the 
left side of Fig. 2 and others adopt the scheme on the 
right), then those authors will not apply the same 
names to taxa of identical composition. Categorical as-
signments are irrelevant under phylogenetic systems 
(Fig. 3), but taxonomic hypotheses are critical to the 
application of taxon names. Under phylogenetic sys-
tems, different authors will only apply the same names 
to taxa of identical hypothesized composition if the 
relevant aspects of their phylogenies are the same. If 
the relevant aspects of the phylogenies differ between 
authors, then those authors will not apply the same 
names to taxa of identical composition (Fig. 6; see also 
de Queiroz and Gauthier, 1990; de Queiroz 1996). Dif-
ferences or changes in ideas about phylogenetic rela-
tionships can also lead to differences in the hypothe-
sized composition of taxa under Linnaean systems 
(Fig. 7; see also de Queiroz 1996). 
These examples illustrate that neither phylogenetic 
nor Linnaean systems guarantee clarity, universality, 
and stability in terms of hypotheses about the relation-
ships and composition of taxa. The reason is that both 
types of nomenclatural systems clearly separate taxo-
nomic hypotheses from nomenclatural rules. Taxo-
nomic hypotheses, ideas about relationships and the 
composition of taxa, must be free to differ and change 
if taxonomy is to be a nonauthoritarian and evolving 
discipline. Therefore, in both Linnaean and phyloge-
netic systems of nomenclature, rules governing the ap-
plication of names are deliberately formulated so that 
they are independent of specific taxonomic hypothe-
ses. That is to say, both systems deliberately separate 
the purely formal process of applying names from the 
more creative and intellectual processes of reconstruct-
ing phylogeny and, in the case of the Linnaean system, 
assigning ranks. One consequence of this separation is 
140 de Queiroz ALISO 
Scheme One 
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0 
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Thetazetina 
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Alphathetonia • Alphadeltina 
Thetazetina 
Fig. 6. The hypothesized composition of taxa designated by phylogenetically defined names can vary depending on the accepted 
phylogeny. The Gamma-Delta clade is most closely related to the Alpha-Beta clade in the scheme (phylogeny) on the left but to the 
Epsilon-Theta clade in the scheme (phylogeny) on the right. The name "Aiphadeltina," defined as the clade stemming from the most recent 
common ancestor of Alpha and Delta, designates a clade that includes four terminal taxa (Alpha-Delta) in the context of the former 
phylogeny, but it designates a clade that includes all eight terminal taxa (Alpha-Theta) in the context of the latter. 
that names governed by either system can be applied 
unambiguously under any taxonomic hypotheses 
framed within the general context of that system-that 
is, under any hypothesis about relationships (under 
phylogenetic systems) or about relationships and cat-
egorical assignments (under Linnaean systems). This 
permits the same names to be applied unambiguously 
as taxonomic knowledge is continually improved and 
refined. Another consequence is that the hypothesized 
Scheme One 
SO. Alphineae 
F. Alphaceae F.Thetaceae 
composition of taxa is only guaranteed to be unam-
biguous, universal, and stable when authors agree 
about the relevant aspects of their taxonomic hypoth-
eses. 
The difference between Linnaean and phylogenetic 
systems of nomenclature thus boils down to a differ-
ence in how taxonomic hypotheses are conceptualized, 
which is related to the difference in the underlying 
bases of those systems. In Linnaean systems, the Lin-
Scheme Two 
F. Alphaceae. Thetaceae 
SF. Thetoideae 
Fig. 7. The hypothesized composition of taxa designated by names defined using Linnaean definitions can vary depending on the 
accepted phylogeny. The Gamma-Delta clade is most closely related to the Alpha-Beta clade in the scheme (phylogeny and set of categorical 
assignments) on the left but to the Epsilon-Theta clade in the scheme (phylogeny and set of categorical assignments) on the right. The 
name "Alphaceae," defined as the clade including Alpha that is assigned to the Family category, designates a clade that includes four 
terminal taxa (Alpha-Delta) in the context of the former scheme, but it designates a clade that includes all eight terminal taxa (Alpha-
Theta) in the context of the latter. Notice that composition of the taxon designated by the name "Thetaceae" also differs between the two 
schemes. Because the designations of names defined using Linnaean definitions depend on categorical assignments, other designations are 
possible. For example, in the context of the phylogeny (but not the categorical assignments) on the right, "Alphaceae" might refer to a 
clade that includes only two terminal taxa (Alpha and Beta), rather than four or eight, in which case the Gamma-Delta clade would either 
be recognized as its own Family or be included in Thetaceae, thus creating a difference in the composition of that taxon between the two 
phylogenetic hypotheses. (F=Family, SF=Subfarnily, SO=Suborder.) 
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naean hierarchy is fundamental to the conceptualiza-
tion of taxonomic hypotheses in that the application of 
taxon names requires assignment of taxa to categories 
in the Linnaean hierarchy. Nevertheless, the principle 
of descent is also important in that hypotheses about 
phylogenetic relationships affect ideas about the com-
position of taxa. In phylogenetic systems, the principle 
of descent is fundamental to the conceptualization of 
taxonomic hypotheses in that the application of taxon 
names requires a phylogeny; the Linnaean hierarchy, 
however, is irrelevant. Consequently, in Linnaean sys-
tems, universality and stability in the hypothesized 
composition of taxa designated by particular names are 
compromised by differences or changes in ideas about 
both phylogenetic relationships and categorical assign-
ments, while in phylogenetic systems, they are com-
promised only by differences or changes in ideas about 
relationships. In other words, as the basis for a system 
of nomenclature, the Linnaean hierarchy interferes 
with effective communication about evolutionary taxa 
by allowing differences in categorical assignments to 
generate ambiguity, nonuniversality, and instability 
even when there is complete agreement about phylo-
genetic relationships. 
Phylogenetic knowledge.-Perhaps the most com-
mon misconception about a phylogenetic system of 
nomenclature is that its use requires more extensive 
and definitive knowledge about phylogeny than is cur-
rently available for many groups. On the contrary, a 
phylogenetic system requires neither extensive nor de-
finitive knowledge about phylogeny. As noted above, 
a phylogenetic system allows names to be applied un-
ambiguously and consistently in the context of alter-
native phylogenies, which implies that use of such a 
system does not require definitive phylogenetic knowl-
edge but only the willingness to make phylogenetic 
conjectures. Phylogenetic hypotheses do not have to 
be certain or correct, but they do have to be put for-
ward. 
Indeed, the impossibility of obtaining definitive 
phylogenetic knowledge-that is, the fallibility and 
concomitant impermanence of phylogenetic hypothe-
ses-is the reason for having a formal system of no-
menclature. If all the details of phylogeny were known 
with certainty, there would be no need to concern our-
selves about how to apply names to taxa; it would be 
obvious. Our ideas about phylogeny would never 
change; hence there would be no alternative taxonomic 
hypothesis nor any need for rules about how to apply 
existing taxon names in the context of alternative hy-
potheses. But this is not how taxonomy works. Re-
constructed phylogenies are provisional hypotheses 
that are continually being revised and refined. Unless 
we want to replace or redefine existing names every 
time a new phylogeny is proposed, we need rules for 
applying those names unambiguously in the context of 
new phylogenetic hypotheses. In short, the purpose of 
a phylogenetic system of nomenclature is not to pro-
vide rules for applying names after we figure out all 
the details of phylogeny; instead, its purpose is to pro-
vide rules for applying names in a phylogenetically 
meaningful way as we continue to work out those de-
tails. 
CONCLUSION 
The Linnaean hierarchy has been an integral part of 
biological taxonomy for nearly two and a half centu-
ries. It has proved highly useful for representing the 
hierarchical relationships of taxa, and it has experi-
enced remarkable longevity. One of the greatest tri-
umphs of the Linnaean hierarchy and a factor that was 
probably critical to its longevity, in particular, its per-
sistence into modem taxonomy, was the ease with 
which it accommodated an evolutionary world view. 
Indeed, the groups-within-groups structure of the Lin-
naean hierarchy seemed almost ideally suited for rep-
resenting the structure of taxonomic relationships im-
plied by the principle of common descent. 
If the Linnaean hierarchy had been used only as a 
device for representing hierarchical relationships, sim-
ilar to the numerical prefixes or indentation of later 
authors, it might never have come into direct conflict 
with the principle of descent. But the Linnaean hier-
archy was treated as more than a simple representa-
tional device; it was granted considerable theoretical 
significance. For most taxonomists after Linnaeus, the 
very concept of a taxon became inseparable from that 
taxon's categorical assignment, and this was reflected 
in the systems of nomenclature developed by those 
taxonomists. This explains why taxonomists common-
ly confused taxa and categories (Mayr 1969a; Griffiths 
1976), why they placed so much emphasis on cate-
gorical assignments-as manifested in their frequent 
debates about the categorical assignments of taxa 
(Hennig 1969, 1981), and most importantly, why they 
used a method of definition in which associations with 
the Linnaean taxonomic categories are fundamental to 
the meanings of taxon names. 
Because the theoretical significance granted to Lin-
naean categorical assignments is most evident in Lin-
naean taxonomic definitions, it is not surprising that a 
conflict between the Linnaean hierarchy and the prin-
ciple of descent has arisen in the area of nomenclature. 
This conflict arises because systems of nomencJature 
based on the Linnaean hierarchy effectively grant more 
importance to the association of a name with one of 
the Linnaean categories than with a unit of common 
descent (de Queiroz and Gauthier 1994). Although res-
olution of this conflict does not require total elimina-
tion of the Linnaean hierarchy from taxonomy, it does 
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require nearly complete restructuring of the nomencla-
tural systems in current use, replacing the Linnaean 
hierarchy with the principle of descent as the basis for 
those systems. A consequence of this change is that 
the significance of the Linnaean hierarchy will be 
greatly reduced. The Linnaean hierarchy will become 
irrelevant to nomenclature, and in so becoming, it will 
lose most of its former implicit theoretical signifi-
cance. Fortunately, this fate seems appropriate. 
In Linnaeus's time and for nearly 100 years after-
ward, the theoretical significance granted to the Lin-
naean hierarchy was not unreasonable. At that time, it 
was at least conceivable that life's diversity was or-
ganized into a fixed number of discrete hierarchical 
levels, which might have been designated by the cat-
egories of the Linnaean hierarchy. Alternatively, if 
taxa were merely artificial collections of organisms, 
then the number of categorical levels could be dictated 
solely by convenience. After acceptance of the prin-
ciple of descent, however, the interpretation of taxa as 
evolutionary units rather than artificial collections of 
organisms directly contradicted the latter position and 
made the position untenable. The continuity of descent 
and the presumed frequent and continual branching of 
phylogeny contradicted the notion of a fixed number 
of discrete hierarchical levels; certainly, the possibility 
that the hierarchical structure of life's diversity could 
be fully accommodated with seven or even 100 taxo-
nomic categories became inconceivable. Consequent-
ly, although taxonomists after Darwin have continued 
to grant considerable implicit significance to the Lin-
naean categories through their use of Linnaean defi-
nitions, they have explicitly called the significance of 
those categories into question. Specifically, they have 
acknowledged that the assignment of Linnaean cate-
gorical ranks, particularly above the species level, is 
subjective, arbitrary, and artificial (e.g., Simpson 1961; 
Davis and Heywood 1963; Mayr 1969a). 
In this context, one of the most important outcomes 
of the evolutionization of taxonomy was that it effec-
tively proposed alternative taxonomic categories of 
greater theoretical significance. By equating species 
with evolving population lineages, the New System-
atics replaced an artificial category with a evolution-
arily meaningful one. Because that new category was 
given the same name, "species," the species category 
became natural--or at least theoretically significant. 
Similarly, by equating higher taxa with clades, groups 
of species united by common descent, Phylogenetic 
Systematics identified another evolutionarily meaning-
ful category. Because that category was given a dif-
ferent name, "clade," the higher Linnaean categories 
did not thereby become natural or theoretically signif-
icant; instead, they remained arbitrary ranks assigned 
to entities of a single kind, though now the entities 
themselves became natural--or at least theoretically 
significant. This change also emphasized the distinc-
tion between the natural higher taxa and the artificial 
Linnaean categories to which they were assigned. 
As biological taxonomy has progressively refor-
mulated its basic concepts and principles to reflect an 
ever more fully evolutionary world view, it should 
have become apparent that the significant taxonomic 
categories are not Kingdom, Division, Class, Order, 
Family, Genus, and Species (in the Linnaean sense); 
the significant categories are clade and species (in the 
evolutionary sense). The taxa that make up these cat-
egories exist at a multitude of hierarchical levels, far 
too many to be accommodated by the standard Lin-
naean hierarchy, and their names can only be ade-
quately defined through explicit reference to common 
descent. Now that we have figured out what are the 
theoretically significant taxonomic categories, as well 
as how to reformulate our nomenclatural systems to 
make them consistent with those categories, the im-
portance of the Linnaean hierarchy has been reduced 
to the point where we must seriously consider whether 
it is worth retaining. The Linnaean hierarchy has be-
come obsolete. 
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APPENDIX. 
A PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE REDUNDANCY IN PLANT TAXON NAMES 
BASED ON PHYLOGENETIC DEFINITIONS 
The distinction between node-based and stem-based definitions 
(Table 2) can be used to eliminate an inconsistency in the Botanical 
Code (IBC 1994) involving redundant taxon names. One of the basic 
principles of the Botanical Code, Principle IV, states that each tax-
onomic group can bear only one correct name. However, the Code 
tolerates several exceptions to this basic principle in the form of 
alternative names, such as "Asteraceae" and "Compositae", "Po-
aceae" and "Grarnineae", and five other pairs, sanctioned under 
Article 18. A useful way to eliminate this redundancy, yet preserve 
all the names, would be to use a node-based definition to define one 
name of each pair as designating a crown group and a stem-based 
definition to define the other as designating the more inclusive clade 
including both the crown and its extinct relatives. Zoologists have 
adopted a similar convention for comparable cases, such as those of 
"Anura" (frogs) and "Salienta" (Anura and its extinct relatives), 
"Caudata" (salamanders) and "Urodela" (Caudata and its extinct 
relatives), and "Gymnophiona" (caecilians) and "Apoda" (Gym-
nophiona and its extinct relatives) (e.g., de Queiroz and Gauthier 
1992; Cannatella and Hillis 1993; Ford and Cannatella 1993). As 
for which name should be used for which clade, one alternative 
would be to tie the names whose suffixes conform with those of 
other taxa traditionally ranked as families (i.e., those ending in 
"-aceae"), as well as the names of those other taxa, to crown clades. 
The names whose suffixes do not conform (i.e., those ending in 
"-ae") would then be tied to the more inclusive clades consisting 
of the crowns plus all extinct plants that share a more recent com-
mon ancestor with those crowns than with other extant plants. The 
obvious advantage of this alternative is consislency in the endings 
of the names in terms of their reference to crown versus stem clades. 
On the other hand, if the names with nonconforming endings are 
judged to be more widely known and used, then it might be pref-
erable to use those names for the appropriate crown clades following 
the reasoning of de Queiroz and Gauthier ( 1992). 
